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ABSTRACT
Text documents play significant roles in decision making and
scientific research. Under federal regulations, documents
(e.g., pathology records) containing personally identifiable
information cannot be shared freely, unless properly sani-
tized. Generally speaking, document sanitization consists
of finding and hiding personally identifiable information.
The first task has received much attention from the research
community, but the main strategy for the second task has
been to simply remove personal identifiers. It is not hard to
see that if important information (e.g., diagnoses and per-
sonal medical histories) is completely removed from pathol-
ogy records, these records are no longer readable, and even
worse, they no longer contain sufficient information for re-
search purposes.
Observe that the sensitive information “tuberculosis” can
be replaced with the less sensitive term “infectious disease”.
That is, instead of simply removing sensitive terms, these
terms can be hidden by more general but semantically re-
lated terms to protect sensitive information, without unnec-
essarily degrading the amount of information contained in
the document. Based on this observation, the main contri-
bution of this paper is to provide a novel information theo-
retic approach to text sanitization, develop efficient heuris-
tics to sanitize text documents, and analyze possible attacks
preventable under the proposed model.
1. INTRODUCTION
Medical documents, such as pathology records, play sig-
nificant roles in detecting, verifying and monitoring new di-
agnostic examinations and treatment methodologies. How-
ever, under federal regulations, e.g., the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [6], because
these records often contain sensitive or confidential informa-
tion, they cannot be distributed freely. As a consequence,
they cannot be used for medical research, e.g., to discover
cures for life threatening diseases, unless properly sanitized.
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In general, document sanitization consists of two main tasks:
(1) Identifying personally identifiable information, e.g., as
defined by the HIPAA safe harbor rules, and (2) “hiding”
the discovered identifiers. Unfortunately, medically relevant
terms can often be identifying, for example conditions re-
lated to the disease (such as weight, which can assist in
identification.) To truly sanitize documents requires hiding
such relatively unique information, which likely goes beyond
obvious identifiers.
The first task has received much attention from the re-
search community, and many commercial products have been
developed to detect personal identifiable attributes. As for
the second task, the main approach adopted by current text
sanitization techniques is to simply remove personal iden-
tifiers (names, dates, locations, diagnoses, etc.,) to prevent
re-identification of text documents. It is not hard to see
that if diagnoses and personal medical histories are com-
pletely removed from pathology records, these records are
no longer readable, and even worse, they no longer contain
sufficient information to allow biomedical researchers to de-
velop treatments for fatal diseases. This can be illustrated
by the following example.
Suppose a phrase “Uses marijuana for pain” is contained
in a medical report. The traditional techniques can sanitize
this phrase by “blacking out” sensitive information, such as
the drug used or diagnosis, turn the phrase into the mean-
ingless “uses for ”. This can cause sanitized texts to
be no longer readable, and hence, document utility is unnec-
essarily degraded. More specifically, let d refer to the sample
text in Figure 1(a), where Sacramento, marijuana, lum-
bar pain and liver cancer are the sensitive terms. Let
d∗ refer to the sanitized text in Figure 1(b), which is the
result of removing sensitive words from d. Clearly, d∗ is
useless for analyzing disease epidemics. Let d† refer to the
sanitized text in Figure 1(c), where sensitive words are re-
placed by more general terms (using the hypernym trees
presented in Figure 2, where a word w in a given tree has a
broader meaning than its children). d† contains much more
information than d∗. However, it still protects sensitive in-
formation (removing specific identifying information as well
as the sensitivity of the type of drug used) and preserves
linguistic structure.
Observe that the sensitive information “tuberculosis” can
be replaced with the less sensitive term “infectious disease”.
That is, instead of simply removing sensitive terms, these
terms can be hidden by more general but semantically re-
lated terms to protect sensitive information without unnec-
essarily degrading document utility (the amount of infor-
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mation). Based on this observation, the overall objectives
of this paper are: (1) provide an information theoretic ap-
proach to text sanitization, (2) develop efficient algorithms
to sanitize text documents based on the proposed informa-
tion theoretic measure, and (3) analyze possible attacks that
the proposed text sanitization approach can prevent, from
the perspective of existing privacy protection models.
A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
(a) Sample text
A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
(b) Sanitized text
A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.
(c) Semantic preserving sanitized text
Figure 1: A sample text and its sanitized versions
1.1 Problem Overview
To avoid unnecessary distortion, our view of text docu-
ment security is as follows: given a threshold t and the set
of word ontologies (e.g., hypernym trees), a sanitized text
should be a plausible result of at least t base text docu-
ments. From this point of view, we will develop information
theoretic measures and algorithms to sanitize text as shown
in Figure 1(c). We make the following assumptions: Given
a document and an (possibly domain specific) ontology, we
can identify a set of sensitive words related to the document
(e.g., using techniques developed in [1, 11, 14] or domain
specific knowledge). In our problem domain, since sensi-
tive words are the focal point, without loss of generality, we
assume a piece of text d only contains sensitive values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
summarizes relevant current work and points out the differ-
ences; Section 3 proposes an information theoretic measure
according to the concept of t-plausibility and analyzes the
hardness of t-plausibility based text sanitization problem;
Section 4 proposes uniform t-plausibility measure and effec-
tive and efficient text sanitization heuristics; Section 5 dis-
cusses how t-plausibility prevents possible attacks by com-
paring existing privacy protection models and issues regard-
ing sanitization of large documents; Section 6 validates our
analyses via experimental results and Section 7 concludes
the paper with future research directions.
2. RELATED WORK
The existing work most related to ours is data anonymiza-
tion and text de-identification. The most common data
anonymization technique is k-anonymity proposed in [12,
15]. Since then, there has been extensive work done related
to anonymizing structured information, i.e., datasets of at
least k tuples in relational format. The proposed work here
focuses on sanitizing a single text-based document with-
out assuming access to a collection of related documents.
Clearly the presence of multiple identical text documents
about different individuals is unlikely; and modifying sim-
ilar documents so they are identical while still preserving
some semblance of semantics and readability requires a much
deeper understanding of documents than Natural Language
Processing is currently capable of. Therefore, applying k-
anonymity directly is not feasible.
2.1 Text Anonymization
Much text anonymization work has mainly concentrated
on de-identification of medical documents. The Scrub sys-
tem [14] finds and replaces patterns of identifying informa-
tion such as name, location, Social Security Number, med-
ical terms, age, date, etc. The replacement strategy is to
change the identified word to another word of similar type
(e.g., an identified name is replaced with a fake name), and it
is not clear whether the semantics of the reports themselves
reveal the individuals. Similarly, [16] provides a six-step
anonymization scheme that finds and replaces identifying
words with pseudonyms from patient records in Norwegian.
In [4], the authors present schemes for removing protected
health information (PHI) from free-text nursing notes. Since
the text in this case does not follow the syntax of natural lan-
guage construction, it poses challenges in recognition of PHI.
The solution consists of techniques such as pattern match-
ing, lexical matching, and heuristics to find the PHI from
nursing notes. Moving away from purely syntactic based
recognition of identifying information, MEDTAG [11], a spe-
cialized medical semantic lexicon, is used for finding person-
ally identifying information in patient records. This system
uses the semantic tags for disambiguation of words, and also
relies on manually written disambiguation rules to differenti-
ate between words that have different contextual meanings.
The identifiers are then removed from the medical records.
To our knowledge, there exists very little work that ad-
dresses the general problem of text sanitization. A two-
phase scheme that employs both sanitization and anonymiza-
tion was proposed in [13]. The sanitization step uses auto-
matic named entity extraction methods to tag the terms,
and then replaces them with dummy values. This is equiv-
alent to replacing the selected terms with their correspond-
ing categories. The anonymization phase is defined based
on k-anonymity and only applied on quasi-identifying words
(i.e., words presumed to be combinable with certain exter-
nal knowledge to possibly identify an individual). In [1], an
ontological representation of text document is used to find
and remove sensitive sentences. The pre-defined contextual
restrictions act as the inputs, and also guide the sanitiza-
tion procedure. This results in the sensitive sentences be-
ing removed from the document. Assuming the existence of
an external database containing demographic information,
suppression-based methods were introduced in [3] to sani-
tized documents such that the resulting documents cannot
be linked to less than k records in the external database.
To summarize, existing work mainly focuses on how to
identify sensitive words, and either remove them or replace
them with pseudonyms. The replacement strategies lack
a theoretic foundation, and consequently, without a formal
measurement, it is difficult to judge the quality of sanitized
documents. The work proposed here provides a theoretic
2




















Figure 2: Word ontologies
measure on the quality of sanitized documents from a pri-
vacy protection point of view. These measures provide for-
mal reasonings on how and why a more general term is cho-
sen to replace sensitive information in a given document. In
addition to the given document, the only information avail-
able to us is related word ontologies, or hypernym trees; and
we do not use domain-specific information extraction tech-
niques. We use WordNet [10] in our examples/experiments
to retrieve word ontologies and generate hypernym trees.
3. T -PLAUSIBILITY TEXT SANITIZATION
Before presenting the concept of t-plausibility sanitization
on text (t-PAT), we first introduce key notations and ter-
minologies in Section 3.1. The formal definition of t-PAT is
presented in Section 3.2. Then we prove that t-PAT is NP-
hard in Section 3.3. At the end of this section, we present
a pruning-based algorithm to find the optimal solution ac-
cording to the definition of t-PAT.
3.1 Basic Notations and Terminologies
For the remaining of this paper, the terms sanitization
(sanitized) and generalization (generalized) are interchange-
able. The term “base text” refers a text that has not been










is a word, or phrase recognized by the ontology; where we
use “word” it could also be such a short phrase.) Because we
merely consider sensitive words, most often, d represents the
set of sensitive words in the original text. For example, sup-
pose the text in Figure 1(a) is the original text, then we have
d = [Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain, liver cancer].
Definition 1 (Generalizable ⊳). We say that d is gener-




and d[i] ⊳ d¯[i] for
1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Since we only consider the base texts generalizable to some





list additional notations adopted throughout the paper.
• o = {o1, . . . , om}: Word ontology set represented as a
set of word ontologies related to each word in d.
• d = {w1, . . . , wm}: A base text represented as a set of
terms, where |d| = m, wi ∈ oi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. wi is
equivalent to d[i].
• d¯ = {w¯1, . . . , w¯m}: A generalized text represented as




= m, w¯i ∈ oi and wi ⊳ w¯i. w¯i
is equivalent to d¯[i].
In most situations, a set is considered as an ordered set.
For instance o[i] is the ith ontology of the ith word in d
(i.e., d[i]). Similarly, d[i] can only be generalized to d¯[i].
Figure 2 contains four word hypernym trees used extensively
hereafter. The base values (sensitive values from the original
text) are at the bottom of the ontologies. Values in the non-
leaf nodes can be generalized to any values on its path to
the root. For example, given the first ontology in Figure 2,
Sacramento can be generalized to State capital, Capital and
so on. State capital can be generalized to Capital, Seat, etc.
The integer value, termed as volume, in the parentheses
indicates how many base values can be generalized to its
related value. For instance, the value 32 associated with
Capital (i.e., the volume of Capital) indicates that there are
thirty-two base values (including the four values shown at
leaves) that can be generalized to Capital. Note that the
ontologies shown here are not the complete ontology trees,
and some branches are omitted. The partial ontologies are
extracted form WordNet, but for practicality of illustration,
we do not use complete ontologies. Based on the previously
introduced notations, we define the following functions:
1. W
`








, the word domain func-
tion (W (w¯i) for short):
• Pre-condition: w¯i = d¯[i] and d ⊳ d¯ according to o.
• Post-condition: d[i] ∈
n




, wji ⊳ w¯i for
1 ≤ j ≤ ki and w
1
i , . . . , w
ki
i are base values in oi.
1
Given a generalized word w¯i, it returns a set of all
possible words at the same level of d[i] that can be
generalized to w¯i according to o.
2. Po
`
w′i, w¯i, d, d¯, o
´
→ Prob (w′i ⊳ w¯i), the local proba-
bility function (Po (w
′
i, w¯i) for short):
• Pre-condition: w′i ∈W
`
w¯i, d, d¯, o
´
• Post-condition: The probability that given w¯i (or
d[i]), w′i is the original word.
Given a word w′i in the domain of w¯i, it returns the











w¯1, d, d¯, o
´
× · · · ×W
`
w¯m, d, d¯, o
´¯
,
the text domain function (D(d¯) for short):
• Pre-condition: d ⊳ d¯ according to o.
1Base values are defined as the values from the based level
of the ontology, and base level is defined by that of wi in oi.
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• Post-condition: D = {d1, d2, . . . , dk} and d ∈ D,
where k =
Qm




w¯i, d, d¯, o
´˛˛
.
Given a text d, its generalized counterpart d¯ and a
set of word ontologies, the function returns a set of all
possible texts that can be generalized to d¯ according
to o. We call such set as the domain of d.
4. P
`






, the global plausibility
function (P (d′, d¯) for short):




• Post-condition: The probability that d is gener-
alized from d′.
Given a text d′ in the domain of d, the function returns
the probability that d′ can be generalized to d¯. That
is, P returns the probability that d′ is the original text.
Example 1. Refer to Figure 2, if w¯i = controlled substance,
then W (w¯i) returns {Ecstasy, Marijuana}. Assuming uni-









. Let d = {marijuana, lumbar pain} and d¯ =
{controlled substance, pain}, then D(d, d¯, o) returns d1 =
{marijuana, lumbar pain}, d2 = {marijuana, migraine}, d3 =
{ecstasy, lumbar pain} and d4 = {ecstasy, migraine}. If we
assume uniform distribution in both W (d¯[1]) and W (d¯[2]),




3.2 Plausibility Sanitization on Text
Based on the previously introduced notations and termi-
nologies, here we formally define our text sanitization prob-
lem. Define the sanitization function f as
f : d, t, o→ d¯
which takes a text d, security parameter or threshold t and a
set of ontologies o as the input and outputs d¯. The security
parameter basically restricts the set of possible outputs and
is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (t-Plausibility). d¯ is t-plausible if at least t
base texts (including d) can be generalized to d¯ based on o.
This definition simply says that a sanitized text d¯ can
be associated with at least t texts, and any one of them
could be the original text d. For instance, Let d¯ be the
text in Figure 1(c). Based on the word ontologies in Figure
2, |D(d¯)| = 96, and we say that d¯ can be associated with
96 texts. If t ≤ 96, d¯ satisfies the t-plausibility condition.
When a text is sanitized properly, we should not be able
to uniquely identify the original text. To prevent unique
identification, there should exist more than one text that
could be the base text. These texts are called plausible texts.
The parameter t is defined as a lower bound on the number
of plausible texts related to a given generalized text. t can
also be considered as the degree of privacy that a sanitized
text needs to guarantee.
Based on t, we define the text sanitization problem as an
optimization problem. Since our intuition relies on the con-
cept of t-plausibility, we term the text sanitization problem
as t-Plausibility Sanitization on Text (t-PAT).
Definition 3 (t-PAT). Let t be a threshold, o be a set of
word ontologies and d be a base text. The t-PAT problem
is to find a sanitized text d¯, such that d¯ is t-plausible and
|D(d, d¯, o)| is minimal.
According to Definition 3, the t-PAT problem is to find
a sanitization d¯ of d, such that |D(d, d¯, o)|, is equal to t or
the least upper bound of t. We next show that this text
sanitization problem is NP-hard.
3.3 Hardness of t-PAT
Theorem 1. t-PAT defined in Definition 3 is NP-Hard.
Proof. The reduction is from the subset product problem,
which is defined as follows: Given a set of integers I and a
positive integer p, is there any non-empty subset I ′ ⊆ I such
that the product of numbers in I ′ equals p? This problem
is proven to be NP-Complete [5]. We now show a reduction
from the subset product problem to t-PAT. Assume that
there exists an algorithm A that solves t-PAT in polynomial
time. For each wi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), define a set Mi containing
the volumes of the terms along the path from wi to w¯i, where
w¯i ∈ oi and wi ⊳w¯i. The number of possible w¯i is limited by
the depth of the ontology. For example, refer to Figure 2, let
wi be the word Sacramento and w¯i be the word capital, then
Mi = {1, 4, 8}. The input to A are the setsM1, . . . ,Mm and
the plausibility parameter t. The solution of t-PAT is a set
of m numbers {n1, . . . , nm} such that ni ∈Mi, and
Qm
i=1 ni
is equal to the least upper bound of t.
The subset product problem can be solved using A as fol-
lows. The input to the subset product problem is the set of
integers I = {a1, . . . , am} and the product p. Construct m
sets by creating Mi = {ai, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and invoke A
with inputs M1, . . . ,Mm and p. A returns a set of m num-
bers {n1, . . . , nm}. If
Qm
i=1 ni = p, the subset product has
an answer. This can be obtained by looking at {n1, . . . , nm}
returned by A. If ni = 1, ai is not included in the subset.
On the other hand, if ni = ai, the subset contains the ele-
ment ai. Suppose
Qm
i=1 ni > p, then there does not exist any
subset in I such that the product of the subset is p. Other-
wise, A would have returned such a subset. Since the input
and output transformations can be performed in polynomial
time, we can conclude that t-PAT is NP-hard.
3.4 Exhaustive Search with Pruning Strategy
To solve t-PAT, we can simply enumerates all possible
solutions and picks the best one. This can be easily accom-
plished by a recursive formulation. However, the exhaustive
search is inefficient and intractable for large values of m.
We present a pruning strategy that limits the search space
to improve search efficiency. ESearch Prune (Algorithm 1)
is a recursive procedure to generate combinations of gener-
alizations of a set of words d = {w1, . . . , wm} with the given
ontology o = {o1, . . . , om}. The procedure takes a set d¯
(current generalization up to ith word), the index i, the best
value for t-PAT found so far as tc and its corresponding gen-
eralization d¯c. When i < m, d¯ is a partial generalization on
d. If |D(d¯)| > tc then any superset d¯
′ of d¯ will be such that
|D(d¯′)| > tc. This observation guides the pruning process.
At step 2 of algorithm 1, hi denotes the height of the
hypernym tree oi of word wi, and w¯
+j
i indicates the j
th
generalization (or hypernym) of wi on oi in ascending order
from wi to the root of the tree. wi = w¯
+0
i is a special case.





ESearch Prune is called again with i+ 1. Note that w¯+ji is
selected in an ascending order such that w¯+ji ⊳w¯
+(j+1)
i . The
recursion terminates when i equals m. When this occurs,
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the set d¯ is used to calculate |D(d¯)|. If this |D(d¯)| is less
than tc, but greater than or equal to t then d¯ and |D(d¯)|
are returned as the best solutions. Otherwise, tc and d¯c are
returned. Algorithm 1 lists the steps of a pruning based re-
cursive procedure. It is invoked as ESearch Prune(∅, 1,∞, ∅)
and the returned values are the solutions to t-PAT.
Algorithm 1 ESearch Prune(d¯, i, tc, d¯c) - The Exhaustive
Search with Pruning for t-PAT
Require: d¯ a set containing i generalized words, i an index,
tc the current least upper bound on t, d¯c a generalization
of d whose |D(d¯c)| = tc and d, o, t are implicit parame-
ters
1: if i < m then
2: for j = 0 to hi do
3: if |D(d¯ ∪ {w¯+ji })| > tc then
4: return (tc, d¯c)
5: end if
6: (tc, d¯c) ← ESearch Prune(d¯ ∪ {w¯
+j
i }, i+ 1, tc, d¯c)
7: if tc = t then




12: if t ≤ |D(d¯)| < tc then
13: return (|D(d¯)|, d¯)
14: end if
15: end if
16: return (tc, d¯c)
4. T -PAT REVISITED
The optimal solution to the t-PAT problem defined in Def-
inition 3 may not be the best solution in practice because it
does not consider privacy protection of individual sensitive
words. It is possible that an optimal solution comes from
heavily generalizing only a few sensitive words. This can be
illustrated by the following example.
Example 2. Refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2. Let d be
the text in Figure 1(b). Suppose t = 32, then the optimal
solution d¯ based on Definition 3 is:
A capital resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
The volume of capital is 32 (there are 32 base values gener-
alizable to capital.) This implies that there are 32 possible
texts can be associated to d¯. However, from a privacy pre-
serving point of view, this d¯ does not protect privacy as well
as the following generalized text:
A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.
A solution is to require that every sensitive word be pro-
tected equally. If most of the sensitive words are not gener-
alized, then d¯ contains too much sensitive information. 2
As shown in the example, in practice, not only do we
need to measure the quality of a generalized text d¯ using the
threshold t, but also we need to consider how d¯ can preserve
the privacy of every sensitive word. To achieve this goal, we
next present an information theoretic measure based on the
uniform plausibility assumption - every sensitive word needs
to be protected equally.
4.1 Uniform t-Plausibility and an Information
Theoretic Measure
Uniform plausibility implies that each sensitive word need
to be protected unbiasedly. Under this uniform plausibil-
ity requirement, we can avoid situations where some words
are generalized too much and other words are not general-
ized at all. To materialize uniform plausibility, we utilize
the expected uncertainty of individual sensitive words as a
measure. We use entropy to model this uncertainty and to
accomplish uniform plausibility. Details are given next.
Let m be the number of words that need to be generalized
in d, H be an entropy function and α be a system param-
eter governing the tradeoff between global optimality and
uniform generalization. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, the cost function

















The intuition behind is that the first term defines a global
measure: how close the generalized text d¯ is to the expected
uncertainty defined by t. The second term defines a lo-
cal measure to achieve the uniform uncertainty (leading to
uniform plausibility) among all sensitive words. log t
m
is the
expected entropy of each sensitive word when the text is
properly generalized. Intuitively, the lower C, the better
each sensitive word is protected. Note that the denomina-
tors m2 and m are used as scaling factors so that the two
terms are relatively at the same scale. Detailed discussion
on this issue is presented in Section 4.5.
Next we show how to calculate the entropies of w¯i and d¯.






i , w¯i) logPo(w
j
i , w¯i) (2)
where ki = |W (w¯i)| is the number of words that can be
generalized to w¯i. W is the word domain function and Po
is the local plausibility function. Both functions are defined




P (di, d¯) logP (di, d¯) (3)
where k = |D(d¯)|. D is the text domain function and P is
the global plausibility function. Both functions are defined
in Section 3.1. If we assume that each word is independent.
P (di, d¯) can be calculated as follows:




Example 3. Let w¯i be the state capital in Figure 2, and








= 2. Let d¯ be the sanitized text
in Figure 1(c) (i.e., d¯ = {state capital, drug, pain, carci-
noma}). Let d be the original text in Figure 1(b) (i.e.,
d = {Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain, liver cancer}).
Assume uniform distribution in each w¯i (or d[i]). Then






















Let α = 0.5 and t = 32. If d¯ = {capital, marijuana,
5






















































Clearly, C(d¯′, t) is a much smaller cost than C(d¯, t). This
matches the intuition behind Equation 1 and implies that d¯′
is a better sanitized text than d¯ from a privacy protection
perspective. Indeed, we can observe that d¯′ achieves uniform
plausibility better than d¯. 2
As mentioned before, the optimal solutions presented in
Section 3.4 do not take into account the concept of uniform
plausibility. In other words, if d¯ is optimal according to Def-
inition 3, not all words in d are equally protected. This was
shown in Example 2. Whether or not uniform plausibility
is achievable depends on the structure of hypernym trees.
At least by minimizing C, we can achieve some degree of
uniform plausibility. Our objective here is defined by the
following definition:
Definition 4 (Uniform t-PAT). Given a text d, a set of
hypernym trees o (related to d), alpha value and a thresh-
old t, find a d¯ of d, such that H(d¯) ≥ log t and C(d¯, t) is
minimized.
4.2 Search for Minimizing C(d¯, t) with Pruning
The exhaustive search approach enumerates all the possi-
ble solutions and picks the generalization d¯ that minimizes
the cost metric C under the condition that H(d¯) ≥ log t.
We now present a pruning strategy that improves the effi-
ciency of pure exhaustive search. Key steps are provided in
Algorithm 2. Similar to Algorithm 1, the recursive proce-
dure builds all possible combinations of generalizations of
the words d = {w1, . . . , wm} based on the set of hypernym
trees o = {o1, . . . , om}. The procedure takes a set d¯ (current
generalization up to ith word), the index i, the current min-
imum cost tc and the generalization d¯c whose cost is equal
to tc. The end of recursion is reached when i equals m.
When this occurs, the cost C(d¯, t) of such generalization, as
defined by d¯, is computed. This cost is compared against
the current minimum cost (tc), and if the new cost is lower
than tc and H(d¯) ≥ log t, the current generalization d¯ and
its cost are returned.
When i < m, we apply the pruning criteria to decide
whether further generalization would give us a better solu-
tion with a cost less than tc. Let us assume that the cost
metric (Equation 1) is represented as C = C1+ C2, where C1
and C2 are the global and local measures respectively. Let d¯
be a partial anonymization on d. This implies that |d¯| < m.
The entropy of d¯ is calculated as H(d¯) by the Equation 3.
Let d¯′ be a generalization and also be a superset of d¯. Thus
we have d¯ ⊂ d¯′, |d¯| < |d¯′| ≤ m and H(d¯′) ≥ H(d¯). We
observe the following properties on the cost function.
Observation 1 (Monotonicity property of C2). Given
d¯ ⊂ d¯′, we have the following condition on the the second
term of the cost metric: C2(d¯
′, t) ≥ C2(d¯, t).
Proof. Write C2(d¯






cannot be negative, we have δ ≥ 0. This implies that
C2(d¯
′, t) ≥ C2(d¯, t).
This observation can be used to stop considering the su-
persets of a partial anonymization d¯ when C2(d¯, t) is greater
or equal to the minimum cost (tc) found so far. Given that
C1(S¯, t) ≥ 0, if C2(d¯) ≥ tc then the cost of a complete gen-
eralization consisting of d¯ must exceed tc.
Observation 2 (Monotonic property of Cost metric).
If H(d¯) ≥ log t, then the cost function C(d¯′, t) ≥ C(d¯, t).
Proof. This basically says that the cost metric of a superset
(d¯′) of a generalization (d¯) is greater than or equal to the cost
metric of its subset d¯ when H(d¯) ≥ log t. We establish this
by considering the first and second terms of C individually.
• The first term of the cost metric for d¯ is defined as
C1 = (H(d¯) − log t)
2 (ignoring the coefficient). Since
H(d¯) ≥ log t and H(d¯′) ≥ H(d¯), we have C1(d¯′, t) ≥
C1(d¯, t).
• From Observation 1, we know that C2(d¯
′, t) ≥ C2(d¯, t).
Given the above properties of individual terms, it is clear
that C(d¯′, t) ≥ C(d¯, t).
This observation is used to stop considering the supersets
of a partial anonymization d¯ when C(d¯, t) is greater than the
current minimum cost tc (given H(d¯) ≥ log t).
The pruning strategies avoid generating combinations clearly
worse than the best solution. Algorithm 2 lists the steps
of a pruning based recursive procedure. This procedure is
invoked as Uniform ESearch Prune(∅, 1,∞, ∅) and the re-
turned values minimize the cost function C. The pruning
condition at steps 3-5 is based on Observation 2, and the
pruning condition at steps 7-9 is based on Observation 1.
The notation hi and w¯
+j
i introduced in Section 3.4 indicate
the height of oi and the j
th generalization of wi.
4.3 Proposed Heuristics
Exhaustive search based algorithms are not practical in
the average case. Thus, in this section, we propose three
heuristics to generate sanitized texts that possess the prop-
erty of uniform plausibility. Although the proposed heuris-
tics are simple, they are intuitive, and most importantly,
we also provide an upper bound on the worst case scenario
according to the cost function C. Since to use the cost func-
tion C, we need to know the Po(w
′
i, w¯i) value for each w
′
i in
W (w¯i), for the rest of this section, we assume that words
are uniformly distributed in each W (w¯i).
2 Let w¯−i and w¯
+
i
be the immediate hyponym and hypernym of w¯i on the hy-
ponym tree respectively.
LUB Search (Algorithm 3) consists of two main steps:
finding an upper bound on C, and performing greedy search
to improve the upper bound cost. Steps 1-3 of Algorithm
3 find a generalized text d¯ such that the optimal cost is
always less than or equal to C(d¯, t). Steps 5-7 check the
2In later sections, we will propose a way to assign non-
uniform probability for each word in W (w¯i).
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Algorithm 2 Uniform ESearch Prune(d¯, i, tc, d¯c) - Search
for minimizing C with Pruning
Require: d¯ a partial generalization on d containing i words,
i an index, tc current minimum cost, d¯c a partial gener-
alization whose cost is tc and d, t, o implicit parameters
1: if i < m then
2: if H(d¯, t) ≥ log t then
3: if C(d¯, t) > tc then
4: return (tc, d¯c)
5: end if
6: end if
7: if C2(d¯, t) > tc then
8: return (tc, d¯c)
9: end if
10: for j = 0 to hi do
11: (tc,d¯c) ← Uniform ESearch Prune(d¯ ∪ w¯
+j




14: if C(d¯, t) < tc and H(d¯, t) ≥ log t then
15: return (C(d¯, t), d¯)
16: end if
17: end if
18: return (tc, d¯c)
Algorithm 3 LUB Search(d, t, o, δ) - The Least Upper
Bound Search for uniform t-PAT
Require: A base document d, a threshold t, a set of hyper-
nym trees o and δ a greedy search threshold that limits
the maximum number of deviations allowed
1: for all wi ∈ d do






4: c← C(d¯, t)
5: if c = 0 ∨ δ = 0 then
6: return d¯
7: end if
8: (c, d¯)← MStep Greedy Search (δ, d¯, c, d¯)
9: return d¯
condition C(d¯, t) = 0. If the condition holds, we know that
d¯ is the best possible solution, and no further computation
is needed. The condition δ = 0 (δ is the maximum num-
ber of deviations allowed in greedy search) indicates that no
greedy search is be performed and the current d¯ is returned.
If neither condition holds, the algorithm will continue to the
greedy search phase. The procedure MStep Greedy Search
at step 8 of Algorithm 3 returns a generalized text that is
either the same as d¯ or a better generalized document ac-
cording to Equation 1.
The key steps of MStep Greedy Search are provided in
Algorithm 4. In this procedure, the search space is con-
strained around the generalized text d¯ with the number of
steps confined by the parameter δ. Our intuition is that the
optimal solution is not far from d¯ (computed at steps 1-3).
For instance, if δ = 1, MStep Greedy Search exhaustively
checks all possible one-step deviations d¯c of d¯, and returns




must hold. Let w¯+i and w¯
−
i be the
immediate hypernym and hyponym of w¯i on the hypernym
tree oi respectively. One-step deviation on d¯ means that we
Algorithm 4 MStep Greedy Search (δ, d¯, tc, d¯c)
Require: δ a limit on the maximum number of deviations
allowed on d¯, d¯ a text or a generalized text in the form
of {w¯1, . . . , w¯m}, tc indicating the best current value of
C, and d¯c the generalized text whose cost is tc
1: for i = 1 to |d¯| do
2: d¯′ ← d¯−i ∪ {w¯+i }
3: if C(d¯′, t) < tc and H(d¯′) > log t then
4: tc ← C(d¯
′, t)
5: d¯c ← d¯
′
6: end if
7: d¯′ ← d¯−i ∪ {w¯−i }
8: if C(d¯′, t) < tc and H(d¯′) > log t then
9: tc ← C(d¯
′, t)




13: if δ = 1 then
14: return (tc, d¯c)
15: end if
16: for i = 1 to |d¯| do
17: (tc, d¯c) ← MStep Greedy Search (δ − 1, d¯−i ∪
{w¯+i }, tc, d¯c)
18: (tc, d¯c) ← MStep Greedy Search (δ − 1, d¯−i ∪
{w¯−i }, tc, d¯c)
19: end for
20: return (tc, d¯c)
can generate two new generalized texts by simply changing




i . Let d¯−i denote
d¯− {w¯i}; that is,
d¯−i = {w¯1, . . . , w¯i−1, w¯i+1, . . . , w¯m}
Both d¯−i ∪{w¯+i } and d¯−i ∪ {w¯
−
i } are one-step deviations of
d¯. Base on the above description, when δ = 1, the greedy
strategy MStep Greedy Search generates 2m deviations of
d¯, and returns the best one.
On the other hand, when δ = 2, the MStep Greedy Search
algorithm exhaustively checks all possible two-step devia-
tions d¯c of d¯, and returns the one with the lowest cost. Sim-
ilar to the one-step deviation, through two-step deviation
we can generate a new generalized text from d¯ by making
at most two changes. For instance, we can generalize or de-
generalize3 w¯i twice, or we can generalize or de-generalize
w¯i and w¯j once each. The outcome of two-step deviation
include those of one-step deviation. For the case of δ = 2,
MStep Greedy Search generates 2m2 candidates. In gen-








, for 1 ≤ δ ≤ m
deviations of d¯. The parameter δ determines the additional
cost for finding possibly a better solution than d¯. The size
of δ is determined by the user.
Steps 1-12 of MStep Greedy Search check all one-step de-
viations of d¯ and returns the best one if δ = 1. When δ > 1,
steps 16-19 will be executed to generate deviations of more
than one steps. For succinctness, some steps are omitted
3generalize means moving up in the hypernym tree and de-
generalize means moving down in the hypernym tree
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Algorithm 5 One Step Alternative Search(d¯, d, t)
Require: d¯ a generalized text related to d and t is the pri-
vacy threshold
1: m← |d¯|
2: tc ← C(d¯, t)
3: for i = 1 to m do
4: for j = 1 to m do
5: d¯′ ← d¯−j ∪ {w¯+i }
6: if C(d¯′, t) < tc and H(d¯′) > log t then
7: tc ← C(d¯
′, t)
8: d¯c ← d¯
′
9: end if
10: d¯′ ← d¯−j ∪ {w¯−i }
11: if C(d¯′, t) < tc and H(d¯′) > log t then
12: tc ← C(d¯
′, t)




16: d¯ = d¯c
17: end for
18: return (tc, d¯c)
before the recursive calls. For instance, we need to check if
w¯i is on top or on the bottom of the hypernym tree, and
hypernym trees also need to be modified. We address these
issues in the implementation.
When δ is small, one disadvantage of MStep Greedy Search
is that many possible close deviations of d¯ are not searched.
Since the optimal solution is expected to be very close to
the upper bound in space, we introduce another heuris-
tic, One Step Alternative Search, that searches for the best
solution closely around d¯. This heuristic can replace the
MStep Greedy Search strategy directly in Algorithm 3. Main
steps of One Step Alternative Search are given in Algorithm
5. During each iteration (the outer for-loop), 2m possible
one-step derivations from d¯ are generated, and the one with
the best cost is chosen to replace d¯ before next iteration.
The two greedy search strategies are interchangeable in
the LUB Search. Regardless of which strategy is adopted,
the LUB Search algorithm always guarantees the following:
Theorem 2 (Upper Bound on the LUB Search al-
gorithm). Suppose that d¯ = LUB Search(d, t, o). Then
H(d¯) ≥ log t and C(d¯, t)−C∗ ≤ σ2, where C∗ is any minimal
attainable cost according to Equation 1 and σ is a limiting
factor on the size of hypernym tree.
Before proving Theorem 2, we need the following lemmas
about the entropy of w¯i and the entropy of d¯.
Lemma 1. If words in W (w¯i) are uniformly distributed,
then H(w¯i) = log |W (w¯i)|.
Proof. Since we assume words in W (w¯i) are uniformly dis-
tributed, for any word wji ∈ W (w¯i), Po(w
j
i , w¯i) =
1
|W (w¯i)| .




















= log |W (w¯i)|
Lemma 2. If words in W (w¯i, o) are uniformly distributed
and d¯ = LUB Search(d, t, o), then H(d¯) =
Pm
i=1H(w¯i).
Proof. Assuming uniform distribution in W (w¯i) and from
previous analysis, we can rewrite P (di, d¯) as P (di, d¯) =Qm
j=1
1
|W (w¯j )| . Let k =
Qm














































Now, we can prove Theorem 2 using Lemma 1 and Lemma
2. First we prove the condition H(d¯) ≥ log t and then we
prove the second condition C(d¯, t)− C ≤ σ2.
Theorem 2. Refer to Algorithm 3. Steps 11-17 attempt to
find a generalized text that has lower cost than d¯ (computed
at steps 1-3). In the worst case scenario, assume the d¯ is
returned from LUB Search(d, t, o). Then we have that for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, H(w¯i) ≥
log t
m























H(w¯i) ≥ log t
According to Lemma 2, H(d¯) =
Pm
i=1H(w¯i). Therefore,
H(d¯) ≥ log t. Now let C∗ be a minimal attainable cost ac-
cording to Equation 1. Because we want to derive an up-
per bound on C(d¯, t), let C∗(d¯∗, t) = 0 and H(w¯i) > log tm .


















Let assume the number of words that can be generalized to
w¯i grows exponentially with base 2
σ as the height of the
hypernym tree. (σ is the limiting factor and in practice,
σ = 3 is sufficient.) For instance, assuming w¯i is at level
h of the hypernym tree oi, then the size of W (w¯i) is about
2σh. On the other hand, if w¯′i is at level h + 1 of oi, then
the size of W (w¯′i) is about 2
σ(h+1). Again if we assume





H(w¯i) + σ. Because each w¯i in d¯ is at most one level above
w¯∗i in d¯
∗, H(w¯i) = H(w¯∗i ) + σ in the worst case. Based on
Lemma 2 and Equation 1, the first component of C(d¯, t) can



















































Therefore, C(d¯, t) − C∗ = ασ2 + (1 − α)σ2 = σ2. Since we
assume C∗ = 0 and 0 is the best attainable minimal cost, for
any minimal cost C∗, the equality C(d¯, t)−C∗ ≤ σ2 holds.
4.4 Complexity Analysis of LUB Search
Since LUB Search consists of two phases, we analyze the
complexity of each phase independently. Assume the height
of every hypernym tree is bounded by h. The main cost
of the first phase (steps 1-3 of Algorithm 3) is to find the
upper bound. The upper bound for each word can be found
in log h steps, so the complexity of the first phase is bounded
by O(m log h).
The complexity of the second phase is determined by ei-
ther MStep Greedy Search or One Step Alternative Search.
As analyzed in Section 4.3, MStep Greedy Search’s com-
plexity is bounded by O(mδ). Therefore, complexity of
LUB Search is O(m log h+mδ). In practice, the height of hy-
pernym trees is constant, and the complexity of LUB Search
can be rewritten as O(m + mδ). Due to the fact that the
complexity of One Step Alternative Search is O(m2), the
complexity of LUB Search is bounded by O(m2) if we use
One Step Alternative Search as the greedy strategy.
4.5 The Cost Function C Revisited
In Equation 1, α determines the importance each term
plays in evaluating the cost. Thus, the two terms should
have similar scales or ranges; otherwise, it is hard to choose
a suitable value for α. Having this in mind, we normalize the
first term with m2. This makes sense, especially when words
are uniformly distributed in each W (w¯i). Under uniformity
assumption, H(d¯) =
Pm

























































As shown in the above analyses, by using m2 and m as
the normalizing factors, the first and the second terms of
Equation 1 have comparable scales or value ranges. As a
result, it is reasonable to use α as a single parameter to
adjust the significance of the two terms in the cost function.
5. PRIVACY PROTECTION AND OTHER
PRACTICAL ISSUES
From a privacy protection point of view, how is t-plausibility
different from other text sanitization and data anonymiza-
tion techniques against possible attacks?
5.1 Text Sanitization
Since the t-PAT is designed to sanitize text in general, it
can be adopted in any text or document sanitization pro-
cess. As emphasized before, instead of removing sensitive
words or replacing sensitive words with synonyms, t-PAT
generalizes the sensitive words with a well-defined informa-
tion theoretic measure. If no domain specific word ontologies
or hypernym trees are available, WordNet can be adopted.
More specifically, we show how to use t-PAT to solve the
problem presented in [3], where the privacy protection con-
straint is that sanitized documents cannot be linked to fewer
than k records in an external database.
The ERASE protocol proposed in [3] assumes that the
external database stores demographic information and each
record (in relational format) is associated with an individual.
A record r is associated with a given document d (a medical
report) if they have common words. ERASE sanitizes d by
removing some common words according to certain rules to
achieve the aforementioned privacy constraint. Without loss
of generality, assume medical report d is associated with one
patient. t-PAT can achieve the same privacy constraint as
follows: first build hypernym trees for each attribute of the
external database. Secondly, the sensitive words in d can be
identified as the set of common words between d and some
record r in the external database. By setting t = k in t-PAT,
we can generalize or sanitize d using the hypernym trees.
According to the definition of t-plausibility, the resulting
document clearly satisfies the privacy constraint.
5.2 k-Anonymity
k-anonymity was proposed in [12, 15] to sanitize struc-
tured data. As stated in Section 2, existing k-anonymization
techniques do not fit well with our problem domain, as the
diversity in text (even short segments of text) is such that
the likelihood that k text fragments belonging to different in-
dividuals would be semantically similar and grammatically
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equivalent is low. Either semantics would be lost, or the
solution would require a full parsing and understanding of
semantics so as to generate an common anonymized text
that corresponds semantically to the k (possibly grammat-
ically diverse) texts. However, t-PAT can be adopted to
anonymize structured data and the resulting data still pre-
serves the spirit of the privacy protection guaranteed by k-
anonymity. Next we provide detailed analysis from an infor-
mation theoretic perspective, and assume k-anonymization
is achieved via generalization.
LetX denote a dataset, Y denote the k-anonymous dataset
computed from X, and x ⊳ y denote that x ∈ X is directly
generalized to y ∈ Y In general, k-anonymity can be gener-
alized to the following theorem [8]:
Theorem 3. Y achieved through generalization satisfies k-
anonymity if and only if ∀y ∈ Y , P (x ⊳ y) ≤ 1
k
, i.e., the
probability that y is generalized from x is no bigger than 1
k
.
For generalization based k-anonymization, a set of hyper-
nym trees are generally given. Using these hypernym trees,
t-PAT can anonymizeX to Y . If Y is the result of traditional
k-anonymization techniques, then given x, there is only one
y such that x ⊳ y. On the other hand, if Y is the result of
t-PAT, then it is possible that x can be generalized to mul-
tiple y’s. According to Theorem 3, this does not violate the
privacy achieved through k-anonymity. Certain extensions
to k-anonymity exist, such as l-diversity [9] among others.
Analysis of how these ideas can be incorporated into text
anonymization and t-PAT is left for future work.
5.3 From Text to Document
In general, short texts have limited number of sensitive
words. Can we apply the proposed approaches to sanitize a
document? The answer is positive. However, some cautions
are needed. First, since document length varies, choosing a
value for t is difficult if we treat the document as a very large
piece of text. Also, to achieve uniform plausibility with the
same t value for all sensitive words in the document may not
be desirable because the degree of sensitivity may vary from
word to word. A more natural way to sanitize the document
is to break it into text segments. E.g., we can use sentence,
paragraph or section as a unit. Then sensitive words can be
identified and sanitize using various t values.
Identifying sensitive words is a challenging but a separate
problem. There are frameworks that have been proposed
to solve the problem [1, 4, 14, 16]. These techniques are
domain specific, and additional documents may be required
to train the learning algorithms. Also, we can use taggers
(e.g., Brill Tagger [2]) to tag the text to identify the nouns,
since nouns play significant roles in interpreting the meaning
of a natural language. We can treat most nouns as sensitive
words if no other options are available. Moreover, word sense
disambiguation techniques [7] may be needed to effectively
use WordNet because a word can have multiple hypernyms.
6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
In the experimental analysis, we mainly validate the theo-
retic results presented in the previous sections. As stated in
Section 5.3, we do not intend to directly use our proposed
techniques on sanitizing large documents, and our experi-
mental setting fits this purpose. There are two aspects of
performance of the proposed schemes that we are most in-
terested in: accuracy of the heuristics and the running time.
For the accuracy evaluation, we measure the difference in
generalization that is found by the exhaustive search and the
one found by the heuristic searchers. For the running time
evaluation, we measure the gain by pruning-based search
and heuristic search schemes over the exhaustive search.
6.1 Data Description
For the purpose of experiments, a collection of 50 words
were selected randomly from the Wordnet tree hierarchy.
The chosen words are the leaf nodes falling under the “en-
tity” tree node where there are 30,000 possible words. These
words were selected such that the height of individual word
hypernym tree is close (±1) to 8 (the average height of hy-
pernym tree under “entity”). The words were subjected to
only this height constraint. Wordnet tree structures are kept
for all the selected words. If a word is generalizable to more
than one sense, the first sense is selected as default. In real
scenarios, sense disambiguation tools and domain knowledge
may be used to pick the sense pertaining to each word.
6.2 t-PAT
The ESearch Prune (EP) algorithm, introduced in Sec-
tion 3.4, performs exhaustive search in the worst case. We
measure how the pruning strategy improves the performance
comparing as compared to the pure exhaustive search algo-
rithm. Figure 3(a) shows the time complexity of EP, where
the x-axis shows different sizes of d varying from 10 to 50,
and the y-axis shows the running time in seconds. The
curves in the figures correspond to different t values from
1024 to 16384. We observe that the running time increases
as the size of d increases because when |d| is large, the search
space is also large. This observation is consistent for all t val-
ues. When the size of d is fixed, the running time increases
as t increases since many generalized texts are checked be-
fore the pruning condition becomes effective.
In these figures, we do not show the running time of the
pure exhaustive search algorithm because the pure exhaus-
tive search is very inefficient. For |d| = 10, it took about
56 seconds to complete, and for |d| = 20, it took hours. For
any larger |d| values, we were not able to report the running
time within a reasonable amount of time. From Figure 3(a),
we can confirm that pruning strategy is effective.
6.3 Uniform t-PAT
The time complexity of Uniform ESearch Prune (UEP)
(Figure 3(b)) follows the same trend as EP (α = 0.5). This
validates the proposed pruning strategy. Figure 3(c) re-
ports the time complexity of LUB Search (LUBS) with the
MStep Greedy Search (MSGS) strategy when t = 4096
(other values of t provide identical observation). As ex-
pected that when δ increases, more time is required to exe-
cute LUBS. When δ = 3, LUBS is still more efficient than
UEP. However, since MSGS does not utilize any pruning
strategy, we do not advocate the use of large δ values. When
LUBS uses One Step Alternative Search (OSAS), the algo-
rithm is as efficient as the case when δ is equal to 0 or 1. We
also measured the time complexity of LUBS with varying t
values. Since the height of each hypernym tree is constant,
t does not affect the running time of LUBS.
Experiments are conducted to analyze the quality of the
proposed heuristics. We first generated optimal solutions
using UEP. Then we executed LUBS with the two greedy
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(i) Similarity Score: UEP α = 0.5
Figure 3: Empirical Results
3. The same experiments are run with three t values. Fig-
ures 3(d) and 3(e) show the result. All three figures present
similar results: The bottom curves indicate the optimal cost
(the lowest cost). For the MSGS heuristic, the bigger the δ,
the better (or lower) the cost is. This is consistent with our
theoretic reasoning. When δ is large, more possible devia-
tions of d¯ will be searched, so it is more likely to find a better
result. The OSAS heuristic performs really well, and its re-
sult is almost as good as the optimal solution. This matches
our intuition that optimal solution is spatially close around
the upper bound d¯ generated at steps 1-3 of Algorithm 3.
As mentioned in Section 4.3, even if MSGS checks more pos-
sible deviations of d¯ than OSAS (when δ = 3), it does not
examine spatially close deviations of d¯ as many as OSAS
does. Since we assume words in d are independent, the
OSAS strategy performs better than MSGS. When words
in d are correlated, we expect that MSGS will give better
results. We will verify this in the future.
6.4 Uniform t-PAT vs. t-PAT
We have shown that the solution to the t-PAT problem
does not protect individual sensitive word equally. Here we
validate our claims through empirical results. With the same
dataset, first we generate (using the EP algorithm) the opti-
mal solution of t-PAT (Definition 3). We then compare this
optimal solution with the solution produced from UEP and
other heuristics. Figure 3(f) shows the result regarding the
cost function C(d¯, t) (Equation 1). It can be observed that
MSGS (δ = 3) performs worse than EP. The main reason
is EP always minimize the first term of the cost function,
and the solution generated from MSGS is not very close to
the optimal. The OSAS greedy strategy outperforms EP
because OSAS produces almost optimal solutions.
Figure 3(g) shows the variance of individual word entropy.
The smaller the variance is, the better the uniform plausi-
bility is achieved. For a smaller text, MSGS achieves better
uniform plausibility. When |d| is large, more spatially close
deviations of d need to be searched for a better solution, but
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MSGS fails to do so since δ is fixed to 3. The OSAS strat-
egy achieves almost optimal uniform plausibility. The same
conclusion can be drawn from Figure 3(h) which shows the
maximum entropy of individual words.
We conducted our experiments with different t and α val-
ues, and only show some results with two different t values
because the observations do not change with other t val-
ues. Regarding other α values (0.25 and 0.75), the variance
analysis remains the same. The MSGS strategy is most af-
fected by δ, and OSAS is extremely close to the optimal,
the α value can only affect its behavior very little, which
depends on the structure of the hypernym trees as well.
Overall, the OSAS strategy works very well. Even though
the MSGS strategy provides moderate improvement over the
upper bound than EP, we expect MSGS will perform better
on correlated dataset, and we will verify this in the future.
6.5 Utility of Sanitized Texts
One way to measure the utility of the sanitized texts
is to adopt measures from information retrieval literature.
Here, we use Cosine Similarity as a measure of utility since
it is commonly used. Utility is defined as the similarity
between the original document d and the sanitized docu-
ment. Let d¯ be a sanitized document produced from the
proposed techniques and d∗ be a sanitized document pro-
duced from the existing suppression-based techniques (i.e.,
sensitive words are removed). For illustration purposes,
let d = {“Diagnose”, “TB”} where “TB” is the sensitive
word. Assume both “TB” and “Bird flu” can be general-
ized to “Infectious disease”. We have d¯ = {“Diagnose”, “In-
fectious disease”} (alternatively, d¯ = {“Diagnose”, {“TB”,
“Bird Flu”}}) and d∗ = {“Diagnose”, *}. The normalized
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〉. Note that the frequency of non-sensitive
word does not change, the frequency of the second word in
d∗ is 0 since it was suppressed, and the frequency of “Infec-
tious disease” in d¯ is divided between “TB” and “Bird Flu”.
The cosine similarity is the dot product of these normalized
frequency vectors. It is clear that the similarity between d
and d¯ is greater than that between d and d∗. This result can
be generalized to any document, and the proposed approach
produces better results than suppression-based techniques.
Experiments are also conducted to measure the change
in cosine similarity score between the original text and the
sanitized text as t changes. When the value of t increases,
the similarity score decreases. Figure 3(i) shows the cosine
similarity between the original text and the sanitized text
for varying t values. The UEP algorithm was used with an
α value of 0.50. Utility measure is not limited to cosine sim-
ilarity. In the future, we will analyze other forms of utility
based on text mining techniques, such as similar document
detection and text clustering.
7. CONCLUSION: ABOUT SEMANTICS?
While we have given an information-theoretic measure of
privacy and cost of anonymization, what does this do to
the text in practical terms? Fully evaluating this would re-
quire analyzing this with real readers; such a human subjects
study is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, we
here present an example, “Uses marijuana for phantom limb
pain”, to demonstrate both the privacy- and semantics- pre-
serving qualities of our approach. This example was chosen
before we had developed the measures an algorithms, as an
example of text that is clearly sensitive (use of an illegal
drug), highly individually identifiable (phantom limb pain
only occurs in amputees), and contains none of the quasi-
identifiers listed in the HIPAA safe harbor rules. Defining
marijuana and phantom limb pain as sensitive, and with
α = 0.5 and t = 10, the sentence sanitizes (using all ap-
proaches) to “uses soft drug for pain.” This eliminates both
sensitivity and identifiability, while preserving readability
and much of the semantics.
While further evaluation and development is necessary,
we believe that t-PAT provides a valuable supplement to
more traditional text sanitization methods, reducing both
sensitivity and identifiability of items that remain even after
traditional (quasi-)identifiers have been removed.
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